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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. 
CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
and Appellants 
vs. 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party 
Plaintiff, and Appellee 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, et al., 
Fourth-Party Defendants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County insofar as it denies Appellants' 
right to recover reasonable attorney's fees in connection with an 
express contract of indemnification. The judgment was entered on 
November 20, 1992. It was certified as final on June 23, 1993, 
The notice of appeal was filed on June 30, 1993. The jurisdiction 
No. 930539-CA 
Priority No. 15 
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of the Utah Court of Appeals rests upon Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(k)(1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that the phrase 
"including reasonable attorney's fees" contained in a hold harmless 
agreement did not apply to enforcement of the agreement itself? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying an award of attorney's 
fees incurred in defending against the claims covered by the 
indemnification agreement between the parties? 
These questions present matters of law for the court to be 
determined under a correctness standard. Gate City Fed. Sav. & 
Loan v. Dalton, 808 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
This case raises a question of contractual rather than 
constitutional or statutory construction. The contract documents 
are located in the Addendum at tabs A, B, C and D respectively. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Defendants, Third-party Plaintiffs, and 
Appellants, Mark and Geneve Cromar, against Third-party Defendant 
and Appellee, Donald Dwyer, to enforce the terms of a hold harmless 
agreement executed by Dwyer in connection with the purchase of real 
estate from the Cromars. The trial court entered summary judgment 
in favor of the Cromars on the agreement, but denied their request 
for reasonable attorney's fees. The Cromars appeal the adverse 
ruling on attorney's fees. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following material facts are uncontroverted. 
On or about November 6, 1979, the Cromars purchased certain 
real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, from Larry M. 
Chaffin and Greta M. Chaffin (the "Chaffins"), the original 
plaintiffs in this case. (R. 172; 183). In connection with the 
purchase, the Cromars executed and delivered a promissory note 
secured by a second deed of trust to the Chaffins in the principal 
amount of $74,000.00 (the "Note"). (R 172-73; 183-84; Add. A, B.) 
On or about July 14, 1983, Donald Dwyer purchased the property 
from the Cromars who conveyed it to him by warranty deed. (R 173; 
184; Add. C.) At the closing of this transaction, Dwyer executed 
an Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing (the "Agreement") 
whereby he assumed the Note and agreed to hold the Cromars 
harmless, including reasonable attorney's fees, from any and all 
obligations contained in the Note and Second Trust Deed. (R. 173; 
184.) The precise contractual language is as follows: 
Buyer hereby holds Seller harmless, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, from any and all 
obligations contained in that certain first 
Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any), and related Note dated 
September 29, 1974, in favor of UTAH MORTGAGE 
LOAN CORPORATION, in the original amount of 
$475,000.00, copies of which are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein, and from any 
and all obligations in that certain Second 
Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any) and related notes dated 
November 6, 1979, in favor of DON L. BUEHNER, 
UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M. CHAFFIN and 
GRETA M. CHAFFIN, husband and wife in the 
original amount of $185,000.00, copies of 
which are attached hereto and incorporated 
herein. (R. 180-81; Add. D.) 
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Dwyer owned the property for a time, made payments under the 
Note directly to Chaffins, and subsequently sold the property to a 
third party. (R. 173; 184.) The Cromars were neither released nor 
discharged by the Chaffins from their obligations under the Note; 
Dwyer was not released, substituted, nor discharged from his 
obligations under the Agreement. (R. 173; 184.) 
On or about November 22, 1990, the Chaffins filed a complaint 
in this action against the Cromars asserting a right to recover 
full payment under the Note. (R. 174; 185). Shortly thereafter, 
the Cromars by letter addressed and delivered to Dwyer's attorney, 
J. Thomas Bowen, demanded payment to be made by Dwyer of all 
amounts due and owing under the Note and tendered the defense of 
the action. (R. 174; 185.) Dwyer refused and failed to pay any 
amounts due under the Note and refused and failed to accept the 
tender of the defense. (R. 174; 185.) 
Upon learning of Dwyer's refusal to pay the amount due or to 
defend the action, the Cromars employed legal counsel to respond to 
the complaint which had been filed against them. (R. 174; 185.) 
On or about December 13, 1991, summary judgment was entered in 
favor of the Chaffins and against the Cromars on the Note in the 
total amount of $83,108.87. (R. 137-38.) The judgment included 
Chaffins' costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $2,454.82. 
(R. 137-38.) This portion of the judgment has not been challenged. 
On or about February 20, 1992, the Cromars again demanded that 
Dwyer honor the terms of the Agreement and hold them harmless by 
making payment of all amounts due under the summary judgment of the 
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court, together with the Cromars' costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred in defending the action. (R. 175; 186.) Dwyer again 
refused and failed to pay any amounts due the Cromars under the 
terms of the Agreement. (R. 175; 186.) 
On or about August 11, 1992, the trial court made a Minute 
Entry under Rule 4-501 granting the Cromar's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as prayed and awarding "such attorney's fees and costs 
against Dwyer as are supported by Affidavit and as are awarded by 
the Court." (R. 260-62; Add. E.) 
Following submission of the Cromar's affidavit and proposed 
judgment, Dwyer filed a notice of objection to that portion of the 
proposed judgment which would have granted the Cromars' attorney's 
fees incurred in seeking enforcement of the Agreement against 
Dwyer. (R. 264.) On or about November 20, 1992, the trial court 
ruled in favor of the objection as a matter of law, modifying its 
minute entry of August 11, 1992 and striking the award of 
attorney's fees to the Cromars in its entirety. (R. 318-20; Add. 
H.) The summary judgment in favor of Cromars and against Dwyer was 
then signed and entered as modified by the order granting Dwyer's 
objection. (R. 315-17; Add. I.) The Cromars appeal from that 
portion of the judgment striking the award of attorney's fees. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE CROMARS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES REASONABLY 
AND NECESSARILY INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INDEMNIFICATION 
AGREEMENT. 
A. Enforceable Contract. 
The Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing ("Agreement") is 
a valid and binding contract of indemnification. Attorney's fees 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in enforcing such a contract 
are recoverable when the contract so provides. 
B. Contract Documents. 
1. Rules of Construction. 
In interpreting the terms of a contract, resort must be 
had to the Agreement as a whole, including the circumstances, 
nature, and purpose of the contract. 
Where an express indemnity contract is involved, the 
extent of the duty to indemnify must be determined from the 
contract itself. Any doubt as to the meaning of an express 
indemnification provision should be resolved in favor of the 
indemnitee. 
2. Contractual Language. 
The contractual language involved is located in two 
separate documents: (1) The Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing 
executed by Cromars and Dwyer; and (2) The Promissory Note executed 
by Chaffins and Cromars and incorporated by reference into the 
Agreement. The precise language is as follows: 
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Buyer hereby holds Seller harmless, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, from any and all 
obligations contained in that cerrain first 
Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any), and related Note dated 
September 20, 1974, in favor of UTAH MORTGAGE 
LOAN CORPORATION, in the original amount of 
$475,000.00, copies of which are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein, and from any 
and all obligations in that certain Second 
Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any) and related Notes dated 
November 6, 1979, in favor of DON L. BUEHNER, 
UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M. CHAFFIN, husband 
and wife in the original amount of 
$185,000.00, copies of which are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein. 
Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing. (Add. D.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
If this note is collected by an attorney after 
default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without, suit, the 
undersigned/ jointly and severally, agree to 
pay all costs and expenses of collection 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Promissory Note dated November 6, 1979. (Add. A.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
3. Extent of Dwyer's Obligation. 
a. The attorney's fee phrase contained in the 
Agreement applies to obligations contained in both First and Second 
Trust Deeds and related Notes because of its placement in the 
sentence before recitation of the principal obligations. 
b. Dwyer's primary obligation to pay attorney's 
fees incurred by Chaff ins in collecting the Note was created by the 
attorney's fee language in the Note itself which he assumed. 
c. Dwyer's secondary obligation to pay attorney's 
fees incurred by Cromars in connection with the Note was created by 
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the separate and distinct insertion of attorney's fees language 
into the Agreement. 
1) The attorney's fees provision was inserted 
before the description of the underlying obligations 
thereby implying a commitment in addition to those 
obligations. 
2) The attorney's fees provision in the 
Agreement was unnecessary and redundant unless it 
referred to an additional obligation beyond payment of 
the Chaffins' fees, since those were already covered by 
express language in the Note which was incorporated by 
reference into the Agreement. 
3) Courts in other jurisdictions have 
construed similarly broad language to permit recovery of 
attorney's fees both for defense of the principal claim 
indemnified against and for enforcement of the indemnity 
agreement itself. 
4) Public policy favors making an indemnitee 
whole by allowing recovery of attorney's fees reasonably 
and necessarily incurred in defending against the 
principal claim covered by an indemnification agreement 
and in enforcing the agreement itself; especially where 
the indemnitor, as here, is given timely notice and 
tendered the defense of the action, but utterly fails and 
refuses to meet his contractual obligations. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
To indemnify is to save or hold harmless; to secure against 
loss or damage; to give security for the reimbursement of a person 
in case of an anticipated loss. Hasbrouck v. Carr, 145 P. 133, 136 
(N.M. 1914); Black's Law Dictionary, (5th ed. 1979). It is an 
obligation resting on one party to make good a loss or damage 
incurred by another. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 
P.2d 97, 100 (Cal. 1975). "The right exists when there is a legal 
obligation on the indemnitee to pay or a sum is paid by him for 
which the indemnitor should make reimbursement." INA Ins. Co. v. 
Valley Forge Ins. Co., 722 P.2d 975, 980 (Ariz. App. 1986). 
This case involves the proper construction of an express 
contract of indemnity, i.e., the Agreement Surviving Real Estate 
Closing between the parties executed on July 14, 1983. (Add. D). 
The first issue is whether the contract provides for recovery of 
attorney's fees for enforcement of the Agreement itself, including 
collection of the judgment against Dwyer. The second issue is 
whether the Cromars are entitled to recover attorney's fees 
incurred in defense of the principal action filed by the Chaffins. 
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I. 
THE CROMARS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES REASONABLY 
AND NECESSARILY INCURRED IN ENFORCING THEIR RIGHT TO INDEMNITY 
PURSUANT TO THE EXPRESS CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
A. Enforceable Contract. 
It has long been established in Utah that an award of 
attorney's fees is proper only if supported by statute or contract. 
B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 
(1972). When expressly provided by contract, attorney's fees 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in enforcing the right to 
indemnity are recoverable. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § (1991). 
In this case, summary judgment based on the Agreement 
Surviving Real Estate Closing was entered in favor of the Cromars 
and against Dwyer on November 20, 1992. (Add. I). That judgment 
was not appealed by Dwyer and is now final. (Add. J, K. ) . 
Consequently, the valid and binding nature of the underlying 
indemnification Agreement has been established. The question is 
whether Dwyer's promise to hold the Cromars harmless includes the 
obligation to pay the attorney's fees incurred by the Cromars in 
enforcing the Agreement itself. 
B. Contract Documents. 
1. Rules of Construction. 
"When a question arises regarding a written document, the 
first source of inquiry must be the document itself, considered in 
its entirety." Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 749 (Utah 1982). In interpreting the terms of a contract, the 
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court must look to the Agreement as a whole including the 
circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract. Utah State 
Medical Ass'n. v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 
646 (Utah 1982) . 
A contractual provision is not necessarily ambiguous just 
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than 
another, but rather to demonstrate ambiguity, contrary positions of 
the parties must each be tenable. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. 
of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). A 
contractual provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1990). "In determining 
whether a provision in a contract is ambiguous, the instrument's 
language must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain 
and generally accepted meaning of the words used, and reference 
must be made to all of the Agreement's provisions." Fibrecrlas 
Fabricators, Inc. v. Kvlberq, 799 P.2d 371, 374 (Colo. 1990). 
Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law for the 
court. Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. 
Where an express indemnity contract is involved, the extent of 
the duty to indemnify must be determined from the contract itself. 
INA Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 772 P.2d at 979. Any doubt 
as to the meaning of an express indemnification provision should be 
resolved in favor of the indemnitee. 772 P.2d at 979 n2. 
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2. Contractual Language. 
In this case, Dwyer's promise to indemnify Cromars is found in 
the Agreement at paragraph d. The entire paragraph reads as 
follows: 
Buyer hereby holds Seller harmless/ including 
reasonable attorney's fees, from any and all 
obligations contained in that certain first 
Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any), and related Note dated 
September 20, 1974, in favor of UTAH MORTGAGE 
LOAN CORPORATION, in the original amount of 
$475,000.00, copies of which are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein, and from any 
and all obligations in that certain Second 
Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any) and related Notes dated 
November 6, 1979, in favor of DON L. BUEHNER, 
UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M. CHAFFIN, husband 
and wife in the original amount of 
$185,000.00, copies of which are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein. 
Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing. (Add. D.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
As it happened, Chaffins sued Cromars on the promissory note 
dated November 6, 1979, and obtained judgment for the entire unpaid 
balance including accrued interest, attorney's fees, and costs. 
(R. 137-38.) The relevant language of the Note which defined 
Cromars' obligation to Chaffins and therefore Dwyer's primary 
obligation to the Cromars reads as follows: 
If this note is collected by an attorney after 
default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without, suit, the 
undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to 
pay all costs and expenses of collection 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Promissory Note dated November 6, 1979. (Add. A.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
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3. Extent of Dwyer's Obligation. 
Dwyer argued below that he was not obligated to pay any of 
Cromars' attorney's fees since the language in the Agreement "does 
not contain any reference to attorney's fees relating to the Second 
Trust Deed or the related notes." (R. 268.) This construction, 
however, is seriously flawed, since it distorts the plain meaning 
of the words and is unreasonable under the circumstances. 
Dwyer's construction could find possible justification if the 
contractual language quoted above had been split into two separate 
sentences and if the attorney's fees phrase occurred only once with 
reference to the First Trust Deed. In the instant case, however, 
such ambiguous sentence structure was not used. Instead, the 
attorney's fees phrase occurred in a single, integrated, extended 
sentence. The placement of the phrase "including reasonable 
attorney's fees" at the beginning of this sentence and before the 
two parallel phrases "from any and all obligations" referring to 
the First and Second Trust Deeds and related Notes, clearly means 
that the attorney's fees phrase was intended to apply to both 
parallel phrases, not merely the first. To read the sentence as 
Dwyer would do, distorts its parallel structure. 
Dwyer's strained construction is also highly questionable 
under the circumstances. Why, for example, would the Cromars 
insist on being held harmless from the obligation to pay attorney's 
fees on the First Trust Deed on which they were not even parties, 
and then exclude the obligation on the Second Trust Deed and 
related Note to which they were? In short, the attorney's fee 
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phrase is not one of limitation, but of necessary inclusion in 
order to afford complete protection to the Cromars in the absence 
of any novation and release of the Cromars by the Chaffins. 
There is, however, another aspect of the contractual language 
which is highly significant. The trial judge concluded that the 
extent of Dwyer's obligation to pay attorney's fees was limited to 
those incurred by Chaffins in collecting the Note. (R. 319; Add. 
H.) These fees were included in the damage award against the 
Cromars and duly paid. (R. 137-38). The judge erred, however, by 
failing to note that the obligation to pay the Chaffins' fees was 
expressly stated in the Note itself. (Add. A.) Thus, the 
attorney's fee language in respect to Chaffins did not need to 
reappear in the Agreement between Cromars and Dwyer in order to be 
binding on Dwyer. Instead, it was expressly incorporated by 
reference into the Agreement. (Add. D.) 
If the obligation to pay Chaffins' attorney's fees was founded 
upon language in the Note itself, what purpose did the phrase 
"including reasonable attorney's fees" play in the subsequent 
Agreement with Dwyer? Here again, the placement of the phrase 
holds the clue to its meaning. The phrase is placed immediately 
after the promise to indemnify or hold harmless and before 
recitation of the obligations to be indemnified against. If it is 
not to be completely redundant, it must include an additional or 
secondary obligation to pay attorney's fees other than those of the 
Chaffins which were already covered by the language in the Note. 
Cromars respectfully submit that the plain meaning of the phrase in 
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the Agreement is to hold them harmless from the obligation to pay 
attorney's fees to their own counsel for any and all legal services 
rendered necessary by Dwyer's refusal to meet his own contractual 
obligations to the Cromars. This includes establishment of the 
right to indemnity and collection of the judgment. 
4. Supporting Authorities. 
Two courts have recently allowed an award of attorney's fees 
in litigation to enforce indemnity rights. In Chetopa State 
Bancshares, Inc. v. Fox, 628 P.2d 249 (Kan. App. 1981), for 
example, the purchaser's assignee brought an action against certain 
sellers to enforce the assignee's claimed indemnification rights 
under a contract for sale of the bank's stock. The lower court 
granted judgment to reimburse the assignee for its attorney's fees 
in connection with two related lawsuits and a tax claim based on 
the bank's conduct, but denied recovery of fees incurred in the 
suit to enforce the assignee's indemnification rights. Ld. The 
Kansas Court of Appeals held that a contractual provision which 
stated that sellers agreed to indemnify and hold purchaser harmless 
from any "expense (including reasonable attorney's fees) suffered 
or incurred by [purchaser] at any time after the date hereof, 
arising from, or as a result or in respect of, the breach of any 
warranty, representation or covenant made by Sellers or any of them 
in this Agreement," was a covenant that sellers would pay those 
expenses, and, thus, sellers were required to reimburse assignee 
for attorney's fees incurred in its suit to establish indemnity 
rights. Id. at 251. 
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In Wuertz v. Tobias, 512 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) 
the lessor of a service station filed a third-party demand against 
the lessee and his liability insurer for indemnification of a 
judgment including attorney's fees incurred by the lessor in 
defense of the action as well as in establishing its right to 
indemnity. In that case, the lessee had agreed to: 
indemnify and hold Lessor, its agents and 
employees, harmless from and against all 
claims, demands, liabilities, suits or actions 
(including all reasonable expenses and 
attorneys' fees incurred by or imposed on 
Lessor in connection therewith) for any such 
loss, damage, injury or other casualty. 
Lessor also agrees to pay all reasonable 
expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by 
Lessor in connection with the provisions of 
this paragraph. 
Wuertz, 512 So. 2d at 1211. 
On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that: 
Amoco is likewise entitled to recover all 
reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees 
incurred in establishing its right to 
indemnity. While it is the general rule of 
indemnity that an indemnitee may recover from 
its indemnitor only those costs and expenses 
incurred in defense of a claim against the 
principal demand, when specifically provided 
for by contract attorneys' fees incurred in 
establishing the right to indemnity may also 
be recovered. 
Wuertz, 512 So. 2d at 1212. 
Even though the contractual language involved in these two 
cases is not precisely the same, it is nevertheless noteworthy that 
both courts were willing to permit an award of attorney's fees for 
enforcing indemnity agreements when the language used appeared to 
contemplate recovery beyond the principal claim indemnified 
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against. Thus in Chetopa, for instance, the agreement was to 
indemnify the purchaser for attorney's fees incurred "at any time 
after the date hereof" because of a breach by the sellers. 628 
P. 2d at 251. And in Wuertjz, recovery was allowed for attorney's 
fees incurred by the lessor "in connection with the provisions of 
this paragraph." 517 So.2d at 1211. 
Similarly broad language appears in this case. By placing the 
attorney's fee phrase before the statement describing the principal 
claims to be indemnified against, i.e., "any and all obligations" 
contained in the two trust deeds and related notes, the parties 
contemplated a separate and distinct legal obligation. 
Furthermore, since the principal obligation indemnified against, 
namely the Chaffins' Note, already included an express commitment 
to pay the Chaffins' attorney's fees, there was no reason to repeat 
the same language in the Agreement itself unless it meant something 
in addition to what the Note already provided. In short, the 
attorney's fee phrase appears twice. The language in the Note 
refers to the Chaffins' legal fees. The additional language in the 
Agreement must then refer to the Cromars' legal fees. To restrict 
the meaning of the language in the Agreement to the Chaff ins' legal 
fees, renders it wholly redundant and unnecessary, and defeats the 
intention of the parties as expressed in the contract documents 
taken as a whole. 
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C. Public Policy 
The same result has been reached on grounds of public policy. 
In Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976), for 
example, the court held as follows: 
As to the matter of attorney's fees, we find 
that there was no error in an award of full 
attorney's fees in this matter. While Civil 
Rule 82 would normally only allow an award 
which would "partially compensate" the 
prevailing party, we hold that the "hold 
harmless" indemnity clause should include the 
cost of recovery on the clause itself, as a 
matter of policy. . . . The hold harmless 
clause required that the contractor shall save 
harmless the government from all suits, 
actions, or claims of any character brought on 
any account of injuries or damages sustained 
by any person. The government is not held 
harmless if it must incur costs and attorney's 
fees in bringing suit to recover on the 
indemnity clause. 
552 P.2d at 660 (footnotes and citations omitted). See also 
Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1067 
(Alaska 1979); Duty Free Shoppers Group Ltd. v. State, 777 P.2d 
649, 654 (Alaska 1989) . 
The policy considerations underlying the above line of cases 
apply to the Cromars' situation as well, since an indemnitee really 
is not "held harmless" in the sense of being made whole if required 
to bring suit to recover on the indemnity clause itself. 
In this case, the Cromars gave notice of the pending 
litigation to Dwyer on two separate occasions; (1) shortly after 
suit was filed (R. 174-175), and (2) shortly after judgment was 
entered against them. (R. 185-186). In both cases, Dwyer refused 
and failed to pay any amounts due under the Note or the judgment. 
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The Cromars were thus left no choice but to employ counsel to 
defend the principal action and then proceed against Dwyer to 
recover under the indemnification provisions of the Agreement. In 
addition, Cromars have been compelled to resort to collection 
proceedings in Texas in order to recover on their judgment which 
was again contested by Dwyer. Thus, rather than being held 
harmless, Cromars have been compelled to incur substantial expense 
in the establishment of their rights and the collection of amounts 
lawfully due and owing in this case. In order to be made whole as 
contemplated by the indemnification Agreement, they are entitled to 
reimbursement for the attorney's fees necessarily expended to 
enforce the Agreement against Dwyer. 
II. 
THE CROMARS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES REASONABLY 
AND NECESSARILY INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL CLAIMS 
COVERED BY THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT. 
As a general rule, an indemnitee is entitled to recover as 
part of the damages, reasonable and necessary attorney's fees 
incurred in defending the claim indemnified against. 42 C.J.S. 
Indemnity §20 (1991); 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity §36 (1968). This 
rule is particularly applicable where, as here, the indemnitor was 
notified and given an opportunity to contest the claim but fails or 
refuses to do so. Id. "If the indemnitor fails to defend, then he 
is liable not only for the amount of damages recovered, but for all 
reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in such defense." 42 
C.J.S. Indemnity §20. The rule applies whether the defense is 
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successful or not and even though attorney's fees are not expressly 
mentioned. Id. 
In this case, Cromars filed an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees 
and Costs clearly including services rendered in defense of the 
Chaff ins' action on the Note as well as services rendered in 
prosecuting the third party complaint and motion for summary 
judgment against Dwyer. (R. 304-05; Add. F). Dwyer subsequently 
filed a Notice of Objection to Proposed Judgment and Memorandum in 
which he objected to an award of attorney's fees incurred by the 
Cromars in pursuing their claim against him. (R. 264-72). In 
responding to the objection, however, the trial judge struck out 
his previous award of attorney's fees to the Cromars in its 
entirety, including any award for services rendered in defense of 
the principal action. (R. 315-16; Add. I.) Under either express 
or implied contract principles, this action was prejudicial error 
and should be reversed. 
Under express contract principles, the same analysis set forth 
in Point I applies. Specific use of the attorney's fees language 
in the Agreement in addition to the Note established a secondary 
obligation on the part of Dwyer to pay the Cromars' legal fees. 
That obligation would clearly apply to fees incurred in defending 
against "any and all obligations" contained in the Second Trust 
Deed and related Note which constituted the principal claim 
indemnified against. In the absence of any contractual language 
limiting or barring such recovery, the Cromars are entitled to an 
award of those fees. 
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The same result follows from implied indemnity principles. 
Even in the absence of express contractual language, a party who 
establishes a right to indemnification based upon his/her 
relationship to another is entitled to attorney's fees reasonably 
and necessarily incurred in defense of the claim indemnified 
against. Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d at 446 ("an 
indemnitee is not held harmless pursuant to an implied indemnity 
agreement if it must incur expenses to vindicate its rights"); 
Piedmont Equip. Co./ Inc. v. Eberhard Mfg. Co., 665 P.2d 256, 259 
(Nev. 1983). 
It would be incongruous indeed if the Cromars were entitled to 
recover their defense fees in the absence of any contractual 
language at all, but be denied them in the presence of such 
language in an express contract. Since such language was 
specifically inserted into the Agreement, this court should reverse 
the lower court and direct that it be given full force and effect. 
CONCLUSION 
Mark and Geneve Cromar are entitled to an award of all 
attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in defending 
against the principal demand of the Chaffins pursuant to the 
express contract of indemnity with Dwyer. They are also entitled 
to an award of attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred 
in enforcing their right to indemnity under the terms of the 
Agreement itself. The summary judgment of the lower court should 
be reversed insofar as it denies the Cromars' attorney's fees and 
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the case remanded for a determination and award of such fees as are 
just. 
DATED this (o* day of October, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
By 
Paul M. Durham, Esq. 
G. Richard Hill, Esq. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Mark and Geneve Cromar 
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ADDENDUM A 
NOTE SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST 
(INSTALLMENT — INTEREST INCLUDED) 
y 7 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, 
November 6 19_J79_ 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order 
0f LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. CHAFFIN. h i s w i f e t a t its 
office in Salj^Lake^^lt^ , Utah, 
SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND and NO/100 -a******************* T)OT.T,ARS ($74.000.00 ), 
together with interest from date at the rate of _jaine_jand_J3/4 percent (.9-3/.ft%) per annum 
on the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
SIX HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE and 77 /100 *******
 D 0 LLARS (? 635,77 ) o n t h e 
— A£5 day of December ^ 1 9 - Z £ _ , and the same amount on the same day of 
each succeeding month until December 1
 t 1JLB2 , when the entire unpaid principal 
with accrued interest shall become due and payable. Each payment shall be applied first to accrued 
interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any such installment not paid when due shall 
bear interest thereafter at the rate of Ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part there-
of, the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal bal-
ance and accrued interest due and payable. 
* or w i t h i n 15 days of the due d a t e thereof , 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either 
with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses 
of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, 
demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions 
of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to 
the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, 
with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Deed of Trust to Security Title Company, a Utah Corporation, as 
Trustee. 
MARK R. CROMAR 
""GENEVBTD .' CROMAR 
THIS FORM F U R N I S H E O BY SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE Q O O O O O 
EXHIBIT "A" 
ADDENDUM B 
I—Amd 1 « 1 
r* 
S'-ett 
AOCrtU 
CryO 
Stait 
L 
3361275 
i 
j 
• P A C K Af tOVC T H I S L I N K F O R R S X O R O t R S UffC • 
SECOND DIED OF TIUST 
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This Deed of Trust, mad* thu . 6th . day of . November 
MARK R. CRQMAR s n d GENEVE P . mflMAR. M « x 
HiQ6_yjUA£e_lll_EoAd Salt Lake Citx. 
it 72 . b*t»»«ti 
aa TRUSTOR. 
whoM addrcaa la 
f3tra*t and numbtr) (City) 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, . Utah corporation, aa TRUSTEE, and . J ^ J ^ B J E H H E k .UNI 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. CHAFFIN, hia w i f e 
-Utah 8UZ1 
<Suu; 
QRAUflH. 
. . aa BENEFICIARY, 
W i t n e s s e i : That Tmator CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER OF SALE, lha following dtaerlbed 
property. aituaUd in S * l f c L a k c County. SUU of UUh: 
d 
Lota 11 to 21, both Inclusive, ••Ji%»ajanr«>arr»i. iflyrWir^ii.fW.^ 
SOUTH BOULEVARD ADDITION, according to tha official p at thereof. 
Block 2, 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM, the following described portion conveyed to the State 
Road Conmiaeion of Utah for Highway known aa Project No. U-218: 
BEGINNING at the Northweat corner of Lot 17, Block 2, SOUTH BOULEVARD 
ADDITION, and running thence Eaat 129 feet; thence South 6 feet, more or less, 
to a point 35 feet South of the City Monument line o»» 21a". South Street; 
thence North 89* 58' -1" West 129 feet; thenc* North 6 fe^, more or less, 
to the point of BEGINNING. 
/0 
•9 
*0' 
T"TMh#r with •»» building*, ftaturaa and lwpc»nw»nii tnam>n and ti l watrt nfhta, rights nf way, m r m r n u rtnw. IngH, proflta. Inroma. tpfwnanta. 
hrrfrliumtnit. prlvlltfM and appwrtafianra* ih#rvwm« hrlonftng. now m h»r*ettar uwii ut #nK»jr»»l with w M pruwny. or any pari \h*n**. RI.'fUKCT. 
MtwrVKR. to tha right, powar and authority har*4naft*r glvan la and ronfarrad upon Dantfirtary to rollart and apply aurh rant a. taaua*. and profit* 
t%t I ha Ptirpoao of B+cttrinf t 
( I) p*r«*«<** •< * « lnwab»a«1«—a avldanaad »y • pr«ml»a«ry na*w)at rv*n d«*a Harvaf aw lha principal aum *f I 1 & 3 L « Q ( U L » Q Q , 
-"»-> »f 1rw*ia#. pa)ya»ta ' • lH« *4— •* S#n#<»tl«ry • • th« tlmti, in >h# »»»•< 
**w«tU ar m* vtf i««tt*#it nWaarfi (1) lha pa*4«rfna .«a a* •a*h a y a—nam a* 
I with lnn>r«tt • • nW*lm M I t«rt*<. «nd vny «at«>*W«*a a*d/< 
vo«rt« 01 hereofier mar be mode to Trustor, or his successors ©r assign*, when evidenced by • » » W " I H « » T not© ©» n©tes reciting that they or* secured 
by tKU D*«d of Truth «f d (4) the payment of oil »umt eaponded «r advanced by ©©n©fklory under ©r pvwoni »o th© t©rmt hereof, together with .nterrti 
thereon oi *•»#«« provided. 
To Trolfrl Th* Security of TM« Dead of Truwl. Truoigr Afrggs! 
1. To keee toid properly in good condition ond repair; not to rimo»t ©r demeiith any building thereon: to complete ©' retiore promptly and m 
good O^d workmanlike m«M«r 0nf building which may b* Construct©*, domoget, ©* destroyed lh©re©n- I© COmpir w.lh oil l«» i . i»*tngnt| pnd retlr.c 
Item ©Meeting l©id prop* rty; not to <©mmtt ©r pe»mil wast© thereof, not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property <n violation e* tow to 
do ol. other a m which t.-©m"the character or ute el sold property may bo reotonobly r.»«*»M*r. the teocif** ©nume»©it©ns here.n no* eadudmg the 
general; o«d. if the !©«m ttfwrod horkby or ony port thereof «* being obtomed I©* the B«'»o»« o< f'"«n<ir.g c»nsttwction •• improvements en »o«d property 
Truilor further agroott 
(ol To commence contiructien promptly and to pursue Mm* with reasonable diligence to completion .n accordance with plant ar>d tpeo 
ficoiiont satisfactory to tonalrciory. ond 
(b) To allow ••nofidory to intpoct Mid property at oil flm©S during construction. 
Trustee, vpon preientotton to it ol on ofiidovit signed by ©onefkiary. setting forth facts she, .ring o default by Trustor under thi* numbered para 
gropfc, it owtnorited to accept ot true ond conclusive oil loett ond statement* therein, and to act thereon Hereunder 
7. To provide ond maintain (nturance. of tuch typo or typat and amount* at oonoficlorv may require, an me Improvement* now eaitting or here-
oftr>r erected ©• ploced on to id property. Such inturonco *holl b« carried In componl©* oppro%od by beneficiary wfm loss payable ctautat in lave* of ond 
in form acceptable to oeneficiory. In the event of lo*l. Trwttor tholl f Ivo In-.medtore nock© to IWnof'rlory, who may make proof of lott. ond each in*wronce 
company concerned it hereby oufhorltod and directed to make payment for tweh lott directly :• tonoficlary. Inttead of to Trwttor ond ieneliclory jointly, 
ond the inturance proceedt. or ony pari thereof, may bo oppiiod by tonoficlary, at Ift option, to the reduction of tno indebtednett hereby tecured or »o 
the reitorotion or repo.r of the property damaged. In the ovonl lH«t mo Trwttor tholl fail to provide totltfactory hotord inturance. the ieneflciary may 
procure, en the Trvtter t behoH. inturonco In fovor of the oonofldorf olone. If inturonco cannot bo tecured by mo Trvttor to provide me required cover, 
oge. thit will conttltute on act of default under the termt of ml* PeeOj of Trvtt. 
3. To deliver to, pay for and main..'in with fceneficlory until me indebtednett i*«»*ed hereby it eoid In lull, tuch evidence of title at ee«e»ic»o'y 
may require. >n«lwd>ng ebitroctt of title or potroe* of title inturonco ond any eatentient o' '*newoit there*I or tupph*>rontt thereto. 
4. To opera' m ond Jc>end ony action or proceedlna purportIne; to affect the »•<••..>. hereof, the titU *o told properry. or the right* o* power* of 
Beneltciorv or Tru«*e«; ond tKouKf oenefklory or Trustee elect to oppoor In or deteod ony tuch action or proceed r»f. to pay all cottt ond eaoentet. m. 
eluding ton of evidence of title ond ottorney't foot »n o reotonoblo tirm l*€w4 by fWnefic»ory or Trutteo. 
5. To poy e* leott 10 doyt b*<o'e delinquency oil toaet ond attOttmentt offerfinp »oid property, including oH ottottmentt upon wnter compony 
ttock ond oil rem*. o«t«t*menit ond charge* for water, appurtenant to or w«ed in connection with told property; to poy. wKen due. oil encumbrance*. 
charge*, end lient with Interett. on «aid property or any pan marao*. which at any time opoeor to bo prior or tuporlor heretot to pay all to*H. feet. 
^ond eioeniei of *hii Trutt. ««»>  t i 
7. Should Trutior foil to make any payment f is do any art at here<* provided, then ieneflciary or Truttee but without obligation •>• 'O do and 
without notice •• or 4»mort4 upon Trutior ond witlieut roleating Trvi'«r from any obligation hereof, mayi Make or do 'he tome in tuch m9**nmr end 
»o tuch i m m at either may doom neceitary to protect the tecurity hereof. Ieneflciary or Truttee being authorised to enter upon toid property for tuch 
purpoteti commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the tec-.' - hereof or the right* or power* of oeneficiory or 
Tru»te«; poy. purchote, contett. or compromise ony emumbronco, charge or lien which in the |udgm« of either appear* to bo prior or tupenor hereto: 
and in eaercuing any tuch power*. Incur ony liability, ••pmnd whotevor amount* In it* absolute d«*«eilon it may deem nocettory therefor, including 
cott of evidence of title, employ counsel. on«* pay hit reotonoblo foo*. 
• - To pay immediately and without demand all twmt eapondod korewndor by oenefklory or Truttee, with Interett from dote of eapenditure et 
the rote of ten per cent (tO%> p*r annum until paid, ond the repayment thereof tholl bo tocured hereby. 
{^r-n<KWKXXWCaOtuWKI*>XM 
II IS MUTUAUY AGItED TMATi 
10. Should toid property or any port thereof be tak«n or damaged by reoton of ony pub>k improvement or condemnation proceeding, or damaged 
by 'ire. or earthquake, or in ony other manner, oeneficiory tholl be emitted to all compensation, award*, ond other payment* or relief therefor, and 
»holl be entitled at iti option to commence, npoeor in and prosecute in it* own name, any action or proceeding*, or to make any comp'omite or *ettl* 
m*nt, in connection with iuch lokmg or domege. All tuch compentotten. award*, damage*, ncj^tt of action and proceedt. Including the proceedt ol ony 
po*«>et ol ••»• end otner insurance affecting toid property, ore hereby omened to •eneliciory. who may. after deducting therefrom all l»» eapenie*. 
including o»erner • *•••. apply the same en any indebtednett tecured hereby. Trutior agree* to eaecwto tweh lurthet otitgnmentt of ony compentotton. 
oword. domege*. 9^4 r.ght* of oction ond proceedt os oeneficiory or Trustee moy require. 
I I . At any time end from time to time upon written request of tenefkiary, payment of It* fee* and presentation of thtt Oeed of Trutt ond the note 
for endorsement fin cote of full reconveyance, for cancellation and retention) without orfe<«<»g '"• liability of any person for the payment of the indebted-
nen secured hereby, and without dealing i f * Interett of any party Joining In rhlt Oeed o' Trutt. Truttee may (a) consent to the making of any map or 
plot e< toid propcMy: lb) ,o<n .n grontlng any easement or creating guy restriction thereon, (c) join In ony subordination or other agreement affecting this 
feed of Trust or tSe lien or charge thereof, (d) grant any eatentten «r modification of the t«rms of thlt loom (e) reconvey, without warranty, all or any 
port of told property The grantee in any reconveyance moy bo described ot "the person or person* entitled thereto", and the recitals therem of any 
mo"ert or font ihell be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof, trvttor agree* to poy roatonoblo trustee'* foot for ony of the service* m*m.wd in 
thit paregreph. 
12. At edditional security. Trustor hereby assign* to oenefklory, during the continuance of these trust*, ell rent*. Ittue*. royalties, ond profits of 
the property affected by thi* Deed of Trust ond of ony personal property located thereon. Until Trustor shall default In the payment of any indebtedn*** 
secured hereby or .n the performance of ony agreement hereunder, Trwttor tholl hove the right to colled all such rent*, issue*, rayoltie*. and profit* 
earned prior 10 deiawlt ot troy become du* ond payable. If Trwttor ehoM default a* ofo'etord. Truttor't right to collect any of tuch money* thoU ceote 
and eeneliciery tholl hove the right, with or without taking pessottion of the property affected hereby, to celled oil rents, royalties. Ittue*. ond profitt. 
failure e» discontinuance of oenelkctary ot ony time or from tlmo to time to tolled ony tuch moneyt tholl no» k* ony manner of led the subsequent en. 
forcement by lonofkrory ol the right, power, ond authority to tolled the some. Nothing contained herein, nor the eeercise of the right bf f>ene»»s»e»y 
to collect, shall be, or be tonsttwod to bo. on affirmation by beneficiary of ony tenancy, loose or option, nor on assumption of liability wnder. no* o sub-
ordination of th« l.*n or charge of this Oeed of T»w»t to ony such tononty, >SSM or option. 
13. Upon any defowh by Trustor hereunder, beneficiary moy ol ony time without notice, either In person, by agent, or by 0 receiver to be ©e 
pointed by 0 court (Iruttor hereby consenting to the appointment of beneficiary ot such receiver!, and without regard to the adequacy of on* security 
for the Indet'edne** hereby secured, enter upon and toko possession of toid property or any pan the oof. m its own name sue far or otherwise collect 
tolO' tenit. uiuei. ond profitt. Including these post 4v and unpaid* «nd apply the tome, less costs and eapen«»« -„• ope>««on ond collection, including 
reasonable attorney t leet. upon ony Indebtednett secured hereby, o)nd fn tweh order os ienelKiary m«.r determine 
14. The entering upon ii%4 taking possessie < of sold property, the collection of tuch -entt ittues, on« profits, or the proceeds 0' fire and Other 
irturence polices, or cemperietten or awards lor any taking or domege of said property, end th» .ppdcation or reieav* thereof n% alaretaid. shall 
net sure or waive any deloult a* notice ol default hereunder or Invalidate any act done pvtuem to such notice 
QUOIT? 
rured hereh^ er la the vriatmmrt* of any 
the eeiien ef eeneflclery. In the event ef turn default. 
te M U M Mid property te be told te tetitfy »*• ebtige-
» tome pen *r pert*I thereof It tltuoted. teneflcrery 
15. The failure en the pert #4 teneflclery to promptly enforce r*y rlghl hereunder thall net operate a* a we»ver ef tuch right and the weiver by 
•enellclory ef any default thell net conttttvte a waiver ef any ©thee ©r tubtectuent dalawH. 
16. Time .* of the ettenc* hereof. Upan defeutt by Truttor In the payment of any 
ogreement K«r«vnd*r, all wmi tecvred hereby thell immediately became due mr»4 payable el 
oeneliciary may oaecute or i t v M Truttee »e e secure a wrlnen notice ef default and ef election 
Hani hereof, end Trviiee aholl file tuch n~tlce for. record In each county wherein told property i 
alto thell depetlt with Trvttee. tKe ne*e m*4 all docvmentt evidencing eapendltvrea tecvred 
17. After the topee ef tvch time at may tKen be required by taw faltawlnf the recardettno ef told natlca ef eVevtt, and notice ef default and 
notiti ef tal* Kevin* been given at then required by law, Trvttee, wdhevt de.nend an Trvttar. theft tell oald •teperty an the date mnd at (he time 
ond place detonated In to id natlce ef tele, either at a whale er In eeporete parcelt. mnd In tvch order at H may determine fbvt tvblect la any aetutory 
right of Trvttar te direct the order In which tuch property, If contltOng af aeverel known le«t er parcel*. ihell be udd). et public auction »e the hlghett 
bidder, the pwrchata price payable In lewf«rl money af the Untied Stetea at the time af tele. The pertan conducting the tale mmy. far any certe he 
deemt eap«d»ent, pattpane the tale from time te time until It thall be completed end. In every each tate. notice af pattpanemant thall be given by 
pvbll- decloretlen thereof by tvch per ton at the lime and place tatt appointed far the talet provided. If the tale It pettpened fat longer than one dey 
beyond the day d«tigneted In the net** of tale, natlce thereof thall be given In the tame mnnnmt at the original no* re af tale. Trvttee thall eaecute 
end deliver to lh» purcheter Itt Deed tenveymg tald property ta aeid, but without any covenant af werrenty, eaprett er Implied. The recltolt In the Deed 
ef any manert er factt thell be cenclutrve proof ef the truthfulnett thereof. Any pertan. Including tvetklery, may bid at the tale. U v v t * thall o».,-ry 
the proceedt of the tale te payment af ( I ) the cettt end eapentet af eaertlting the pawer af tale and af the tale. Including the payment af the Trvttee't 
and atterney't feeti (2) coat af any evidence af title procured In connection with tuch tale nn4 revenue ttempt en Trvttee't Oeedt (3) ell >vmt eapended 
under the terma heraef, net then repaid, with accrued interett at 10% par mnnum from date ef eapendituret (4) all ether tumt then tecvred hereby 1 
and (3) the remainder. If any, la the pertan or portent legally tMilled thereto, er the Truttee, in Itt ditcretian. may depcrnt the balance af tuch pro-
ceedt with the County Clerk af the ceunty in which the tale teak place. 
I I . Trvttor egreet ta turrender potteatlon of if e h-irelnobeve deterIbed Irutl property to the Purcheter at the efaretaid tale. Immediately eht 
tuch tale, in the event tuch potaetaten hat not previeutly been evfrondorod by Trvttar. 
I f . Upon me acevrenca af any defeutt hereunder, ionofklery thall have the option to declore all tumt tecvred hereby Immed atety due end pay-
able end ferrclote thlt Deed ef Trvtt in the mmnnmr provided by law far the foreclosure af mengeeet en '•*• property mn4 ieneflcirry thall be entitled 
to recover In tuch proceedWtga all ceett mt*4 eapenaet Incident thereto. Including a reatenable atterney't fee in tvch emevnt at thall be flaed by the court. 
20. leneflclary may eeoelnt a tuccenar trvttee at any time by filing for record In the office af the County Recorder of each county In which tald 
property er tome part thereof It iltveted. a tuottftvtton af trvttee. Pram the time the tvbttltvtlen It filed for record, the new trvttee thall tveceed to 
ell the power*, dvliet. evmerWy and title af the trvttee named herein er af any tvecettar trvttee. tech tuch tvbttltvtlen thall be eiecvted mr*4 acknowl-
edged, and natlce thereof thalt be given end proof thereof mode, In the manner provided by lew. 
21. Thlt Deed af Trvat thall apply to Invre ta the benefit af. end bind oil portiet hereto, their helrt. legeteet. devlteet. edmlnlttretera, eaeevtert. 
tvecettort and attignt. All eellgetlent ef Trvttor hereunder ere (aim and teverel. The term "teneticlory" thall moon the owner mn4 holder. Including 
any pledgee, af the note tecvred hereby. In thlt Deed a-* Trvit. whenever the contest ta re quire t. the matculine gender include* the feminine end/or neuter, 
end the lingular number Includet thr plvrel. 
22. Truttee occeptt thlt Tru». when thlt Deed ef Trvtt. duly eaecuted and acknowledged. It made a public record et provided by low. Tr*-*tee It net 
ebllgoted te notify any party f,ereto ef pending tole under ony other Dead ef Trutt or af any action or proceed<"a In which Trutter, ienaflclery, er Truttee 
thell be e
 P—*y. ••*!#•• V:eught by Truttee. 
23. Thlt Deed *f Trutt thall be cenitrved according to the law* af the State ef Utah. 
2 4. The undenigned Trutter reqvettt thot e ropy ef «f>y notice af delauil 9t*4 ef any notice of tole hereunder be moiled te him at the eddrett herein-
before tet lerth. 
25, All righta of Beneficiary hereunder are auhject to the righta of the holder of the 
flrat mortgage on the property. 
MARK R. CROMAR 
STATE nr UTAII 
county «{ Sal t Lak« - I -
6 th 
. day of _ U f f i L v W b t r , . A-IX I t 7 9 , pereontlly appeared bHorr m* 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENFVF D. CROMAR, hla vife 
Iht- •i.-flrrJe. of the within Inetrumenl. oho duly erknnwledgerl to me that CJaCy cirrutrd the 
My CnmmlMtrm e i p t m : . 10-12-62 
^foury Pyf'.c. fUtldtng tt 7^^ 
Sal t Lake Ci ty , Utah 
i 
$ 
. A.D. 10- — pereonally apneered before me . 
. who hetnf by me duly awern dhi aay. each for himself, that he. the aeld . . 
Ovetrtrnt. »nA he. the aeld . la the . . _ . ftocromey 
anrt that the within and forra»*n« Instrument wee aignwl m behalf »«f ealrl rereoratlon by 
authority nf a reaelutlcm ml tta Hoard af Dtrenara. and aeld . _ _ - - . . . . . ._ and — . ,.. 
rarh duly acanirwlertted ta me that aeld rtwpnrathin eirrvlwl the H I M and that lh» **•! affiled la the arel <4 aeld rwpomten. 
My Cummlaalon eiplrea: 
Noury Publk lUaldlni at 
000113 
ADDENDUM C 
Recorded tt Request of Grantee, 
at M. Fee Paid $-
by _ _ Dep. Book Page Ref. 
Mai! tax notice to Address 
WARRANTY DEED 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. CROMAR, husband and wife grant-rs 
of Salt Lake City .Countyof Salt Lake , State of Utah, herebv 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
DONALD DWYER 
grantM 
of fur the sum of 
TEN AND NO/lOOths DOLLARS 
and other good and valuable considerations 
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake Court/ 
State of Utah: 
Lots 11 to 21, both inclusive. Block 2, SOUTH BOULEVARD ADDITION, according -D -t 
official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Record*-
EXCEPTING THEREFROM, the following described portion conveyed to the State Road 
Commission of Utah for Highway known as Project No. U-218: 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 17, Block 2, SOUTH BOULEVARD ADDITIO* 
and running thence East 129 feet; thence South 6 feet; mbre or less, to a po^» 
35 feet South of the City Monument line on 21st South Street; thence North 89° 
58'51" West 129 feet; thence North 6feet, more or less, to the point of BEGI**:% 
Subject to easements, restrictions, reservations and rights of way of record 
Subject to annual general property taxes for 1983 and subsequent years theres#,.t-
SuDject to a Trust Ottd dated September 20, 1974 in favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOA* 
CORPORATION, with an unpaid balance of $441,587.68 at of Juno 1, 1983, recoroo* 
November 11, 1974, at Entry No. 2664056, in Book 3719 at page 366, Salt Lake Cou*i/ 
Recorder. (Affects this and other property). 
Subject to a Trust Deed dated November 6, 1979, executed 1n favor of DON L. BuC-*(*. 
UNIVEST CORP., LARRY M. CHAFF1N and GRETA M. CHAFFIN, husband and wife, with a* 
W H ^ M A W ' W1M&* &i™ *• 1983> "«>"" ltov**«r 6* 1973ay;; 
, A. D. 19 
**as Entry No. 3361275, 1n Book 4980 at page 796, Salt Late County Recorder. 
Signed in the Presence of J Sssltuk t^ &C+>->+J 
c.k< • • M u I W R K * • CROMAR 
Subject to matters of record, or »nfnfr»»M« :eab!e In law nr f a u l t y — - ^ 
^CCT>T^± 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of SALT LAKE 
On the W^ day of fa^f^*** , A. D. 19 8 3 
personally appeared before m t MARK ft CROMAR and 6ENEYE D. CROMAR 
the signer s of the within inatmmcnt, who duly acknowledged to ma that t hev executed tht 
• • •MA J same 
My commission arpinn V"ft"5*7 Residing fa Salt Lake City, Utah 
• L A N K «ioi—w*.«**rY o«co--C OEM PRINTING CO — ««I.T UAKJ 
( A (/rf Notary Public 
^-idin  in 
I FAJUiaoomTrUcU^Lnow/i EXHIBIT B • ^ IAMC)UNTTAu)^a^L^tton^e« 
ADDENDUM D 
AGREEMENT SURVIVING REAL ESTATE CLOSING 
WHEREAS: 
1. OONALD DWYER, (hereinafter referred to as "Buyer"), is abo.t 
to purchase from MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. CROMAR. (hereinafter :oi*•::•.»'. 
referred to as "Seller"), the real property known as 2119 South Rege~*. 
28 East 2100 South 
Street,/Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah; 
2. Buyer and Seller desire that certain promises survive the clos*-: 
of said real property and the delivery of the final deed of reconveyance 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of Buyer paying the purchase price of 
said real Droperty and in consideration of Seller conveying said real 
property to Buyer, Buyer and Seller hereby agree to the following: 
a. Buyer and Seller understand that PARAMOUNT TITLE CORPORATE 
cannot guarantee or verify the figures pertaining to the ' " s * 
Trust Deed and Note 1n favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORA*::% 
and the Second Trust Oeed and Notes 1n favor of DON L. BUE-s::. 
UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN and GRETA M. C H A F F I N ^ M - '• 
If the figures used in the related settlement statements are 
Inaccurate, Buyer and Seller mutually agree to make appropr-i-t 
adjustements. 
b. Seller guarantees that the note secured by said first Trust 
Deed is current to and Including the monthly payment due Ma/ 
1, 1983. 
c. Seller guarantees that the notes secured by said second Trust 
Deed are current to and Including the monthly payments due 
June 1, 1983. 
d. Buyer hereby holds Seller harmless, Including reasonable 
attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained 
1n that certain first Trust Deed (Including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any), and related Note dated September 20, 1974, 
in favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION, 1n the original 
amount of $475,000.00, copies of which are attached heretc *~: 
incorporated herein, and from any and all obligations in fa*. 
certain Second Trust Deed (Including the "due-on-sale" cla-s?. 
if any) and related Notes dated November 6, 1979, 1n favc •• 
DON L. BUEHNER, UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN a--
GRETA M. CHAFFIN, husband and wife 1n the original amount :*' 
(continued..) 
EXHIBIT C 0001G9 
S185.000.00, copies of which are attached hereto 
and incorporated herein. 
e. The matters set forth herein shall survive the dos'~; :r -.-? 
transaction,and the -eiu'mjawee s* *** fi'Mtie "e . ;... . • 
DATED this day of June, 1983. 
Sellers 
*«1w*Bt in !•¥•» i f S t l l u UBUlLiJ H ' 1 "i 1 mj. 
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AGREEMENT SURVIVING REAL ESTATE CLOSING 
WHEREAS: 
1. DONALD DWYER, (hereinafter referred to as "Buyer"), is about 
to purchase from MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. CROMAR, (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Seller"), the real property known as 2119 South Regent 
28 East 2100 South 
Street,/Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah; 
2. Buyer and Seller desire that certain promises survive the closing 
of said real property and the delivery of the final deed of reconveyance; 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of Buyer paying the purchase price of 
said real property and in consideration of Seller conveying said real 
property to Buyer, Buyer and Seller hereby agree to the following: 
a. Buyer and Seller understand that PARAMOUNT TITLE CORPORATION 
cannot guarantee or verify the figures pertaining to the first 
Trust Deed and Note in favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION 
and the Second Trust Deed and Notes in favor of DON L. BUEHNER, 
UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN and GRETA M. CHAFFIN.his wife. 
If the figures used in the related settlement statements are 
inaccurate, Buyer and Seller mutually agree to make appropriate 
adjustements. 
b. Seller guarantees that the note secured by said first Trust 
Deed is current to and including the monthly payment due May 
1, 1983. 
c. Seller guarantees that the notes secured by said second Trust 
Deed are current to and including the monthly payments due 
June 1, 1983. 
d. Buyer hereby holds Seller harmless, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained 
in that certain first Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any), and related Note dated September 20, 1974, 
in favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION, in the original 
amount of $475,000.00, copies of which are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein, and from any and all obligations in that 
certain Second Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" clause, 
if any) and related Notes dated November 6, 1979, in favor of 
DON L. BUEHNER, UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN and 
GRETA M. CHAFFIN, husband and wife in the original amount of 
(continued..) 
$185,000.00, copies of which are attached hereto 
and incorporated herein, 
e. The matters set forth herein shall survive the closing of the 
transaction,and the feeewvoyawee ef the pwpchais weriLj JLLJ sf** 
DATED this day of June, 1983. 
Sellers: 
Buyer: 
MARK R. CROMAR 
<?rj 
GENEVE D. CROMAR ^ ^ 
DONALD DWYER | fy/ W~% 
**tmw6t in fa¥0P sf Sol 1ar LAELULLJ it clncing. 
ADDENDUM E 
7r, * i,^ 
AUG 1 1 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and 
GRETA M. CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, 
Defendants and Third 
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third Party Defendant and 
Fourth Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. 
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET, 
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE 
COMPANY, 
Fourth Party Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY - RULE 4-501 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. 900906903 
The Court has reviewed third party plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Memorandum in Support of Third Party 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Mark 
0002(10 
CHAFFIN V. CROMAR PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
R. Cromar, the Affidavit of Geneve D. Cromar, the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Affidavit of Donald Dwyer, the Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Third Party Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Complaint, the Third Party Complaint, the Answer of third party 
defendant Donald Dwyer and the documentation pertaining to the 
entry of summary judgment against defendants Mark R. and Geneve 
D. Cromar. 
Based upon said review, the Court grants third party 
plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The legal liability 
of Cromars to Chaffins has been determined. Dwyer agreed to 
hold Cromars harmless "from any and all obligations. . . in 
favor of. . . Larry M. Chaff in and Greta M. Chaff in. . . ." 
The Second Defense in Dwyer's Answer admitted this. No 
specific facts have been set forth in the Affidavit of Donald 
Dwyer as to how the schedule of payments on the subject 
property was inaccurate or creating any legally sufficient 
defenses against the Cromars. 
Accordingly, third party plaintiffs Mark R. and Geneve D. 
Cromar may have summary judgment against third party defendant 
Donald Dwyer for $83,108.87, plus 12% per annum interest from 
and after December 13, 1991, until paid. Cromars shall be 
0002G1 
CHAFFIN V. CROMAR PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
awarded such attorney's fees and costs against Dwyer as are 
supported by Affidavit and as are awarded by the Court. 
Counsel for third party plaintiffs shall submit an 
appropriate Summary Judgment. 
000202 
CHAFFIN V. CROMAR PAGE FOUR MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Minute Entry - Rule 4-501 Ruling, to the 
following, this J^aay of August, 1992: 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Laura L. Moser 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 S. State, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Paul M. Durham 
G. Richard Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
36 S. State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
and Fourth Party Plaintiff 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen W. Brinton 
Attorney for Fourth Party Defendants 
151 East 5600 South, Suite 320 
Murray, Utah 84107 
dtmkwri Mm/if 
0U02G3 
ADDENDUM F 
WSTWGT COUR1 
Paul M. Durham (0939) 
DURHAM & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. ) 
CHAFFIN, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ] 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. ] 
CROMAR, ; 
Defendants and ] 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
v s . ] 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party
 t 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. 
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET, 
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE 
COMPANY, 
Fourth-Party Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No4 900906903CN 
i Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
SETM 
BX XA 
9 n W * 
^ ufTr.LERK 
000303 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PAUL M- DURHAM, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a member of the Utah State Bar in good 
standing. 
2. I am a shareholder and director of the law firm of 
DURHAM & EVANS. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in 
this affidavit and, if called to testify with respect to the 
matters set forth herein, I would be competent to do so. 
4. The law firm of DURHAM & EVANS has been retained to 
represent defendants and third-party plaintiffs, Mark R* Cromar and 
Geneve D. Cromar (the "Crom^rs"), in thte aboVte entitled action due 
to the default of third party defendant for which summary judgment 
has been awarded in favor of the Cromars. 
5. The following is a correct accounting of defendants 
and third-party plaintiffs1 costd and attorneys' fees incurred in 
this case as of the date hereof: 
(a) Costs: 
Filing fee for Complaint $ 50.00 
Fee for Texas service of process 45*00 
TOTAL COSTS: $ 95.00 
(b) Attorneys' fees: 
(Factual investigation; prepar-
ation of documents, affidavits, 
pleadings, research and corres-
2 
000304 
pondence with respect to the 
defense of the action for summary 
judgment by Chaffins and the 
prosecution of the motion for 
summary judgment against Dwyer, 
including preparation of judgment 
and conferences with client and 
opposing counsel regarding the 
same). 
73.5 Total Hours 
TOTAL ATTORNEYS1 FEES: $7,259*75 
Subsequent to the mailing of the Affidavit of Attorneys1 Fees 
and Costs and proposed form of Judgment to opposing counsel, 
opposing counsel objected to the grounds stated for Third-Party 
Plaintiffs' award of attorneys' fees; Counsel spent art additional 
11.0 hours totalling an additional $1,185.00 in researching and 
responding to opposing counsel's objection. This additional amount 
is included in the above total attorney's fees figure. 
3. Based on my knowledge of costs of comparable legal 
services, I affirm that the foregoing costs and fees are reasonable 
and were necessarily incurred in this action* Further costs and 
attorneys' fees will likely necessarily be incurred to execute on 
the judgment. 
4. The legal bases for this award of attorney's fees 
are the provisions in the Note and Agreement Surviving Real Estate 
Closing for reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in collection, see 
Exhibits "AM and kC" to the Affidavit of Mark R. Cromar on file 
with the Court, and on the basis of the Court's award of attorney's 
3 
000305 
fees in granting summary judgment in the Minute Entry, dated August 
11, 1992. 
5. This Affidavit is true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge, information and belief. 
DATED this <p?J3n^  day of September, 1992. 
J^J m. A<1 i-*6*A*^ 
Paul M. Durham 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before roe this ZZhcl day of 
September, 1992. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC / " / A . 
Residing in J yalJ / a.Jb fts //„ CM 
NOTARY P03UC 
JBSSSSSL 
3£LMUCKAY 
000306 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit of Attorneys* Fees and Costs to be hand-
delivered this P ^ V day of September/ 1992, to the following! 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Laura L. Moser 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party Plaintiff 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen W. Brinton 
REEVE, BRINTON & PATTERSON 
Attorneys for FoUrth-Party Defendants 
Suite 320, Washington Mansion 
151 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
s/L/ Mf. A,JC^. 
jmg\cromarat.aff 
5 000307 
ADDENDUM 6 
Paul M. Dursam (0939) 
DURHAM & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. ) 
CHAFFIN, ) 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ) 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, ) 
Defendants and ) 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third-Party Defendant ; 
and Fourth-Party ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. ] 
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET, ; 
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE 
COMPANY, 
Fourth-Party Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900906903CN 
i Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
RU9 W8TM5T 00'JST 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 0 1992 
000327 
Having considered memoranda of both counsel regarding the 
objection of third party defendant Donald Dwyer to an award of 
attorneys' fees to third party plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve 
D• Cromar, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that third party 
defendant Donald Dwyer's objection is BBIUBS. 
DATED this LP day of ^-^rbembQr, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
J{idg£\ Kenneth Rig t i#p 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
000328 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order to be hand-delivered this day of September, 
1992, to the following: 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Laura L. Moser 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 South State #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party Plaintiff 
36 South State #1020 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephen W. Brinton 
REEVE, BRINTON & PATTERSON 
Attorneys for Fourth-Party Defendants 
151 East 5600 South #320 
Murray, UT 84107 
jmg\cromar.ord 
</ZJ AJ. JL 
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ADDENDUM H 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 0 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. 
CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, 
Defendants and Third 
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third Party Defendant and 
Fourth Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, et al., 
Fourth Party Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY - RULE 4-501 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. 900906903 
The Court has reviewed third party plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Support of Attorney's Fees in Proposed Judgment, the third 
party defendants' Reply to Third Party Party Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees and third 
party defendant Donald Dwyer's Notice of Objection to Proposed 
Judgment. 
0003J Vi3 
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A careful reading of the Agreement Surviving Real Estate 
Closing entered between the Cromars and Donald Dwyer on or 
about July 14, 1983 discloses that Buyer Dwyer: 
hereby holds Seller (Cromars) harmless, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, from 
any and all obligations contained in that 
certain first Trust Deed. . . and related 
Note. . . and from any and all obligations 
in that certain Second Trust Deed. . . and 
related Notes. . . . (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that Donald Dwyer only agreed to hold harmless the 
Cromars for all obligations contained in the two trust deeds 
and notes, "including reasonable attorney's fees." Nothing is 
contained in the Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing about 
the payment of attorney's fees for enforcing said agreement. 
The Court concludes that third party defendant Donald Dwyer's 
Notice of Objection to Proposed Judgment is well taken. 
The Court's Minute Entry of August 11, 1992 is corrected to 
strike the award of attorney's fees. The submitted Order and 
Judgment have been modified by interlineation to reflect the 
rulings herein contained. Said Order and Judgment have been 
signed and entered, as modified, this 20th day of November, 
1992. Copies of sadd Order and Judgment are returned herewith. 
Dated this _day of November, 
RIGTRUP 
?CT COURT JUDGE 
^ ^ _ 
00031? 
CHAFFIN V. CROMAR PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Minute Entry - Rule 4-501 Ruling, to the 
following, this r^ H day of November, 1992: 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Laura L. Moser 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 S. State, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Paul M. Durham 
G. Richard Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants 
36 S. State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant and 
Fourth Party Plaintiff 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen W. Brinton 
Attorney for Fourth Party Defendants 
151 East 5600 South, Suite 320 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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ADDENDUM I 
/ . . 
**h fr* * 
Paul M. Durham (0939) 
DURHAM & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 0 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 3\?n\q4 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. 
CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. 
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET, 
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE 
COMPANY, 
Fourth-Party Defendants. 
\-H-R3-3oop~^ 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900906903CN 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
000315 
The Court having granted the motion for summary judgment of 
third party plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D. Cromar against 
third party defendant Donald Dwyer, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that third party 
plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D. Cromar ("the Cromars") be 
awarded judgment against third party defendant Donald Dwyer as 
follows: 
1. For damages in the sum of $83,108.87 plus 12% per annum 
interest from and after December 13, 1991, until paid; 
2 . For ateteornoys —fccc—i^tjjg~^fl^tt"Q^^ • '/-Jfr-erctd'- for 
costs of $95.00. Furthermore),—thft frmrt fixidfe—thafe*-i±—TS 
r^aconably- aftticipa+^ frf^  there may-dae cuiiLJUuiabia wriili to—^^irleciL. 
and—iega±^£ee»sr This judgment shall also cover such additional 
costs am<Hj.egal foots incurred in pursuit of the collection of this 
judgment. The Cromars are entitled to supplement the foregoing 
sumttijfry *ftfcf iriavi t f.i l.nri with-tho Cmu«4, lor uddiLionaJr—aLLuiimyj ' 
fcco~"fiTL& costs which may arise in the future. 
3. Plaintiff is also entitled to interest on the judgment at 
the legal rate for judgments until this judgment has been 
satisfied. T& f/ » 
DATED this 7\P day of -S^ rteSfflgey, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge^Kenneth Rigt/^up 
Dis t r i c t Judge / n n O T l R 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment to be hand-delivered this ,^Q ty/ day of 
September, 1992, to the following: 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Laura L. Moser 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 South State #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party Plaintiff 
36 South State #1020 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephen W. Brinton 
REEVE, BRINTON & PATTERSON 
Attorneys for Fourth-Party Defendants 
151 East 5600 South #320 
Murray, UT 84107 
jmg\cromar.jmt 
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ADDENDUM J 
Paul M. Durham, Esq. (0939) 
G. Richard Hill, Esq. (1490) 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiffs 
Third Ji.«'v.ic»a! District 
m 2 3 1993 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. 
CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
and Appellants 
vs. 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party 
Plaintiff, and Appellee 
vs* 
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. 
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET, 
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES 
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE 
COMPANY, 
Fourth-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
No. 900906903 CV 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Third-party plaintiffs' motion for certification of final 
judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has 
been submitted for decision. The court has reviewed and considered 
the summary judgment entered against Donald Dwyer on November 20, 
1992, together with the summary judgments entered against the other 
defendants in this case. The court has also reviewed and 
considered the pleadings as well as the remaining claims against 
the fourth-party defendants. Based upon this review, the court 
finds that good cause exists to enter the following findings of 
fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action was commenced following a foreclosure and 
sale of certain real property which had been purchased by the 
defendants Mark and Geneve Cromar in 1979; sold to the third-party 
defendant Donald Dwyer in 1983; and subsequently sold to the 
fourth-party defendant Riverview Plaza Associates, Ltd., in 1988. 
It involves three individual complaints to enforce the legal 
obligations arising from three separate transactions. 
2. In the principal complaint, the plaintiffs Larry and 
Greta Chaffin sued the Cromars to recover the balance due under a 
promissory note given in exchange for the property on November 6, 
1979. Summary judgment was entered against the Cromars on the note 
13 0' 
on December Jg&~, 1991. The judgment was paid and a satisfaction of 
judgment filed on January 7, 1993. 
3. Cromars filed a third-party complaint against Donald 
Dwyer to enforce the terms of a hold harmless provision contained 
in an Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing executed on July 14, 
1983. On November 20, 1992, summary judgment was entered in favor 
of the Cromars and against Dwyer determining his liability under 
2 
the terms of the hold harmless provision, but refusing to award the 
Cromars' attorney's fees incurred in enforcing it. The Cromars 
seek to appeal the attorney's fee portion of this judgment. 
4. Over five months have passed since entry of the judgment 
against Dwyer, and no motions for new trial, to alter or amend the 
judgment, or to stay execution thereof have been filed. 
5. Dwyer filed a fourth-party complaint against his 
immediate buyer, Riverview Plaza Associates, Ltd., several general 
partners thereof, and Merrill Title Company which handled the 
closing. On October 13, 1992, the court entered partial summary 
judgment against Riverview and its general partners based on 
contractual obligations assumed by these fourth-party defendants in 
1988. On March 10, 1993, the court incorporated this partial 
summary judgment on Dwyerfs first claim for relief with a summary 
judgment against Riverview and its general partners on Dwyer's 
second claim for relief. 
6. Fourth-party defendant Merrill Title Company answered 
Dwyer's fourth-party complaint on February 26, 1991. No further 
action has been taken against Merrill Title since that time. 
7. A close examination of the record indicates that at the 
present time, the court has entered summary judgments against all 
of the defendants with the exception of Merrill Title Co. All of 
the claims have been resolved with the exception of Dwyer's third 
and fourth claims for relief. 
8. Dwyer's third claim for relief against all of the fourth-
party defendants except Merrill Title demands the return of 
3 
$4,866.29 in excess escrow payments allegedly retained by them at 
the closing of their purchase of the property from Dwyer in 1988. 
9. Dwyer's fourth claim for relief demands judgment against 
Merrill Title only for alleged negligence, misrepresentation, and 
malpractice relating to the closing of Dwyer's sale in 1988. 
10. The only factual overlap between the remaining claims and 
the Cromars' judgment is that the same property was involved in 
each of the sales transactions. Otherwise, there is no factual or 
legal relationship between the Cromars1 judgment which is sought to 
be certified herein and Dwyer's remaining fourth-party claims, 
since the parties, the transactions, the underlying legal 
obligations, and the factual and legal issues are all different. 
11. Since the judgment sought to be certified for purposes of 
appeal is based upon a transaction which is wholly separate and 
unrelated to the transaction on which Dwyerfs remaining claims are 
based, there is no just reason why certification of the Cromar's 
judgment should be delayed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This action involves three separate complaints alleging 
multiple claims of multiple parties. 
2. The summary judgment entered November 20, 1992, on the 
Cromar's third-party complaint against Donald Dwyer wholly disposed 
of the claims of these parties. 
3. There is no material degree of factual overlap between 
the issues presented in the judgment sought to be certified herein 
4 
and Dwyer's remaining two claims against the fourth-party 
defendants. 
4. There is no just reason for delay in the certification of 
the summary judgment entered November 20, 1992• 
5. The summary judgment in favor of the Cromars and against 
Donald Dwyer entered November 20, 1992, is final and appropriate 
for certification under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. n 
DATED this 23 day of ^ O ^ ^ ^ 1993. 
BY THEXCO^RT 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be 
mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following this ~1T* 
day of June, 1993: 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Laura L. Moser 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party Plaintiff 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen W. Brinton 
REEVE, BRINTON & PATTERSON 
Attorneys for Fourth-Party Defendants 
Suite 320, Washington Mansion 
151 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Bruce J. Nelsen 
ALLEN, HARDY & RASMUSSEN 
Attorney for Fourth-Party Defendant 
Merrill Title Company 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
r. 5UL J)<W 
grh\cromarl.fof 
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ADDENDUM K 
l i i iu. «tivicia! District 
Paul M. Durham, Esq. (0939) 
G. Richard Hill, Esq. (1490) 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiffs 
JJJJP2 3 1993, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. 
CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
and Appellants 
vs. 
DONALD DWYER, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party 
Plaintiff, and Appellee 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. 
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET, 
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES 
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE 
COMPANY, 
Fourth-Party Defendants. 
ORDER CERTIFYING 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
No. 900906903 CV 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Based upon the motion of third-party plaintiffs for the 
certification of final judgment together with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law heretofore entered by the court in support of 
the motion, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the summary 
judgment in favor of Mark and Geneve Cromar and against Donald 
Dwyer entered on November 20, 1992, be entered as a final judgment 
of this court for all purposes, and it is hereby certified as such 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the 
grounds that it wholly disposes of the claims of the parties and 
that there is no just/reason for delay. 
DATED this Z ^ *ciay of ^\^^nJL^^ , 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed Order Certifying Final Judgment to be mailed, 
first-class postage prepaid, to the following this 1TV; day of 
June, 1993: 
Daniel W. Anderson 
Laura L. Moser 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
and Fourth-Party Plaintiff 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen W. Brinton 
REEVE, BRINTON & PATTERSON 
Attorneys for Fourth-Party Defendants 
Suite 320, Washington Mansion 
151 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Bruce J. Nelsen 
ALLEN, HARDY & RASMUSSEN 
Attorney for Fourth-Party Defendant 
Merrill Title Company 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
G.5UL.JW 
grh\cromarl.ord 
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